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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER BOYCE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.

Case N o . 990641-CA

TAMMY L. GOBLE,
Respondent-Appellant.

Statement of Jurisdiction
This is an appeal from a final order modifying child support in the
Second District Court, Davis County, Utah. Jurisdiction is based upon
§78-2a-3 (2)(h) of the Utah Code. There have been no prior appeals.
Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review
This appeal involves the assertions of the Respondent-Appellant
("mother") that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying child
support obligations based upon a cursory finding that a minor change in
the visitation schedule constituted a substantial change in circumstances,
This issues was preserved for appeal at the trial on the Petition for
Modification (R. 448, pp. 46-47), by her Motion for Reconsideration (R.
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

175-178), and in the argument of her attorney at the hearing on that
motion (R. 235). The issues are stated as follows:
(1) In view of the statutory and case law requirement that child
support orders can be modified

only if the circumstances

have

substantially changed, was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
find that a minor modification of the visitation schedule constituted a
substantial change in circumstances justifying a change in the child
support order? A court's legal conclusion as whether a material change
in circumstances has occurred is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sigg
v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995). Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 43ly 437
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P. 2d 438\ 442 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
(2) In view of the statutory and case law requirement that child
support

orders can be modified

only if the circumstances

have

substantially changed, was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
enter an order of modification based upon cursory findings of changed
circumstances?

The determination of whether there has been a

substantial change of circumstances is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Moonv.Moon.

973P.2d431} 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999);

Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P. 2d 438y 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Determinative Statutes
Sections 30-3-10.4, 78-2a-3 (2)(h), and 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Annotated, are determinative of, or of central importance to, this
appeal, and are in Appendix A of the addendum to this brief.
Statement of the Case
(a) The Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a final order by the Second District Court,
Farmington

Department,

Davis

County,

Utah,

in

case

number

964701453, modifying the original child support order entered less than
three years earlier.
(b) The Course of Proceedings
On November 25, 1996, the mother and father were divorced by a
Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 46-52). Less than a year later, on
August 4, 1997, the father filed a Verified Petition for Modification (R.
70-75), seeking to change both visitation and child support. The mother
counter-petitioned on the issue of visitation only, also on the basis
that the order was unworkable (R. 399). Trial was held July 13, 1998.
The Court afterward signed the Respondent's Proposed Order of
Modification (R. 227-230), continuing

the previous

joint

custody

arrangement but with a more specific visitation schedule. However, the
court also lowered the father's child support obligation. The mother
filed a Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial (R. 175-178), which was
denied (R. 399-401). A Notice of Appeal was filed (R. 411-412).
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(c) Statement of Relevant Facts
On November 25, 1996, the mother and father were divorced by a
Judgment and Decree of Divorce in the Second District Court (R. 46-52).
The decree made provisions for the joint custody of the children and
liberal visitation by the father

(R. 46-47) and the child

support

obligations of the father (R. 47).
Nine months later, on August 4, 1997, the father filed a Verified
Petition for Modification of the decree (R. 70-75), asking to change both
visitation and child support. The mother counter-petitioned on the
issue

of visitation

only,

also

on the

basis that

the order was

unworkable (R. 399). Trial was held July 13, 1998 (R. 448). The trial
court changed the visitation schedule in a minor way, and on the
basis that this visitation change constituted a substantial change of
circumstances, also reduced child support obligations of the father from
$796 in the original Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 796, paragraph
3) to $593 in the Order of Modification (R. 228, paragraph 2).
The court stated the legal grounds for this change as follows:
(a) in its oral ruling at the time of the trial on July 13, 1998:
"The Court would find that the mediated agreement is
consistent with the original decree of joint custody and joint
physical custody, defining the overnight visitation, what
iberal visitation meant
"The Court would find based on the mediation, based
on the time, that this is a joint custody arrangement, a
joint physical, shared arrangement. Mrs. Goble testified that
the plaintiff, Mr. Boyce, would have similar expenses to her

F
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for t h e o v e r n i g h t v i s i t a t i o n s in t h i s .
"The Court would find that that would represent a
substantial change of circumstances, particularly
the mediated
agreement in which they've agreed on specific times, and that this
should be determined under a joint worksheet for
determining
child support." [ E m p h a s i s added.] (R. 448, p p . 49-50)
(b) in its O r d e r of M o d i f i c a t i o n :
1. T h e p a r t i e s will c o n t i n u e to share j o i n t legal and
p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y of t h e i r t h r e e m i n o r c h i l d r e n . P e t i t i o n e r
is awarded t h e f o l l o w i n g specific v i s i t a t i o n schedule
2. The above-referenced time sharing represents
Petitioner
having37% ofthe nights and Respondent having63% of the nights
and these percentages will be used in a joint custody
worksheet
format to calculate child support. [ E m p h a s i s added.] (R. 228)
(c) in its O r d e r on M o t i o n for R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n or N e w T r i a l :
2. T h e C o u r t finds t h a t at t h e t i m e of t r i a l h e r e i n J u l y
3 1 , 1998, t h e C o u r t h e a r d evidence t h a t t h e p a r t i e s agreed in
t h e i r o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e s t i p u l a t i o n to j o i n t legal and j o i n t
p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y of t h e i r m i n o r c h i l d r e n and l i t e r a l
v i s i t a t i o n . T h e C o u r t found t h a t since e n t r y of t h e D e c r e e
t h e r e have been s u b s t a n t i a l , m a t e r i a l changes in c i r c u m stances w h e r e i n t h e p a r t i e s were u n a b l e t o agree on a
v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e and t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s filed p e t i t i o n s to
modify s t a t i n g t h a t t h e j o i n t c u s t o d y t e r m s of t h e D e c r e e were
u n w o r k a b l e . At t r i a l , t h e C o u r t found t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had
resolved m a n y d i s p u t e s . . . i n c l u d i n g h a v i n g agreed t o continue
the joint legal and joint physical custody of t h e i r c h i l d r e n and
h a v i n g agreed on a v i s i t a t i o n schedule a w a r d i n g t o
P l a i n t i f f . . . 3 7 % of t h e t i m e w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n , and D e f e n d a n t
h a v i n g 6 3 % of t h e t i m e w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n . Based on the new
visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, t h e C o u r t
deemed it a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s use a j o i n t p h y s i c a l
c u s t o d y w o r k s h e e t t o calculate t h e a m o u n t of f u t u r e child
s u p p o r t . [ E m p h a s i s added.] (R. 399-400)
S u m m a r y of A r g u m e n t s on A p p e a l
1. E v e n t h o u g h c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n a s i n g l e d e c r e e ,
c h i l d s u p p o r t orders and c h i l d c u s t o d y orders are separate
and d i s t i n c t i s s u e s , each o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m d i f f e r e n t legal
s o u r c e s w i t h separate r e q u i r e m e n t s for m o d i f i c a t i o n .
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is the common practice in Utah that divorce decrees roll child
support orders, child custody arrangements, alimony awards, property
divisions and other issues into a single decree. This is only practical.
Nevertheless, this grouping into a single order does not detract from the
separate legal standards which apply to each of those areas. The law of
child support is governed by §§78-45-2 through 78-45-9, the standards for
child custody are found in §§30-3-10 through 30-3-10.6,and the legal
basis of alimony is set out in §§30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9). Each of these
areas has its own requirements and considerations which must be
followed by the trial court.
2. A legal basis for modifying an existing decree
must be shown in each area to be modified, and a legal
basis in only one area does not open up the entire decree to
modification.
The statutory requirements established by the Utah Legislature
obviously contemplated that the legal criteria for modification must be
shown in each individual area to be modified. A material change on one
issue does not open up the entire decree to wholesale modification.
This intent is demonstrated by the different statutes governing
modification. For example, in child custody situations, §30-3-10.4(l)(a)
states that "the court may...modify an order that established joint legal
custody if: ...the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under
the circumstances." However, an unworkable custody order is not listed
in §78-45-7.2 as one of the grounds justifying modification of a child
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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support order. The trial court must find a legal ground relating to each
issue for which modification is ordered.
3. Child support law is governed by the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act (§78-45-2 et seq), and
modification within three years of the original decree
requires a substantial and material change in
circumstances.
When "a child support order has been issued within the previous
three years, under §78-45-7.2(7) (a) there must be "a substantial change in
circumstances."

§78-45-7.2(7)(b) gives six items constituting a sub-

stantial change in circumstances.
4. The merits of how to modify the child support
order of a divorce decree are not reached until the
threshold requirement of a material and substantial
change in circumstances have been met. If that threshold
is not met, the merits are never considered.
In the child support modification case oiDurfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d
713, 716, (Utah App. 1990), it was held, "On a petition for a modification
of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself."
The meaning of the term "threshold requirement" is that no other
issue of a case is considered until that requirement is met. This is
clearly shown in the divorce case of Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 250,
(Utah App. 1987), when in the context of collateral estoppel the Court
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stated, "Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach the merits of
appellant's other points on appeal."
5, It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
find that a minor change in visitation constituted
grounds for modifying child support.
Finding that the visitation order was unworkable and in need of
modification, the trial court issued an order continuing existing
custody and modifying visitation by a net 1% of the father's nights
with the children. The court then simply moved directly to modifying
child support without any meaningful finding or analysis whatever
of the threshold requirement under §78-45-7.2(7)(b) of a substantial
change in circumstances. This 1% visitation change was inconsequential, not material. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to use it as a basis for ordering a change in child support.
6.
The trial court's cursory findings of fact are
insufficient to support the legal conclusion that
grounds exist for modification of the original child
support order.
The findings of fact relied upon by the trial court, as framed by the
court and quoted in the Statement of Facts, are cursory and legally
insufficient even if true.

The trial court's findings failed to

a

be

sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion of each factual issue was
reached." Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 739, (Utah App. 1992). See also
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, (UtahApp. 1999). The trial court
must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate
what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the
modification made in the prior divorce decree constitutes an abuse of
discretion and reversible error.
Arguments on Appeal
1. Even though contained within a single decree,
child support orders and child custody orders are separate
and distinct issues, each originating from different legal
sources with separate requirements for modification.
It is the common practice in Utah that divorce decrees roll child
support orders, child custody arrangements, alimony awards, property
divisions and other issues into a single decree. This is only practical.
Nevertheless, this grouping into a single order does not detract from the
separate legal standards which apply to each of those areas. The law of
child support is governed by §§78-45-2 through 78-45-9, the standards for
child custody are found in §§30-3-10 through 30-3-10.6, and the legal
basis of alimony is set out in §§30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9). Each of these
areas has its own requirements and considerations which must be
followed by the trial court.
With respect to child support and child custody, the relevant provisions are quite distinct. Child support law and guidelines are found in
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which is Chapter 45 of Title
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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78 of the Utah Code. The Utah Legislature gave the issue of child
support it sown mandates, guidelines and requirements for modification.
Child custody provisions, however, are found in an entirely
different part of the Utah Code in Chapter 3 (Divorce) of Title 30
(Husband and Wife). Again, the Utah Legislature gave the issue of child
custody its own mandates, guidelines and requirements for modification.
Had the Legislature wished to do so, it could have grouped child
support and child custody law into a single act with a single
standard for modification. But it did not. Rather, legislative intent is
that the issues are separate with somewhat similar but nonetheless
differing standards which must be met before modifications can be
permitted.
2. A legal basis for modifying an existing decree
must be shown in each area to be modified, and a legal
basis in only one area does not open up the entire decree to
modification.
The statutory requirements established by the Utah Legislature
obviously contemplated that the legal criteria for modification must be
shown in each individual area to be modified. A material change on one
issue does not open up the entire decree to wholesale modification.
This intent is demonstrated by the different statutes governing
modification. For example, in child custody situations, §30-3-10.4(l)(a)
states that "the court may...modify an order that established joint legal
custody if: ...the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the c i r c u m s t a n c e s / However, an unworkable custody order is not
listed in §78-45-7.2 as one of the grounds justifying modification of a
child support order. The trial court must find a legal ground relating to
each issue for which modification is ordered.
This principle is supported in Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 12511252, (Utah App. 1989): a [W]hen a substantial change in circumstances is
shown, it must relate to the basis upon which the original award was
made by the trial court." This statement was repeated in Muir v. Muir*
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992). Since the original award was made
based upon the relevant statutory criteria, the grounds for modification
must also relate to those same "relevant criteria.*
This principle was clearly established in the alimony case of
Williamson

v. Williamson.

983 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah App. 1999), as

follows:
Before the trial court can modify a divorce decree, it
must find that there has been a 'substantial material change of
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce."
UtahCodeAnn.§30-3-5(7)(g)(i)(1998). Once that findinghas
been made, the court must then consider "at least the
following factors in determining alimony
§30-3-5(7)(a)
(1998). These factors apply not only to an initial award of
alimony, but also to a redetermination of alimony during a
modification proceeding." [Emphasis added.]
It therefore follows that grounds for a change in alimony do not
automatically open up a custody order for modification, nor does a
changein visitation justify a modification of child support. Rather, legal
ground must be shown in each of the areas of custody and child support,
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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andin every other individual areafor which modification is requested.
3. Child support law is governed by the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act (§78-45-2 et seq), and
modification within three years of the original decree
requires a substantial and material change in
circumstances.
When "a child support order has not been issued or modified
within the previous three years, under §78-45-7.2(6) a "showing of a
substantial change in circumstances is not necessary," but when such an
order has been issued within the previous three years, under §78-457.2(7)(a) there must be "a substantial change in circumstances.* There is
no other basis for modifying a child support obligation.
In this case the original Decree of Divorce was entered on
November 25, 1996, (R. 46-52) and the father's petition to modify was
filed on August 4, 1997,(R. 70-75) which is obviously within three years.
There must therefore be a showing of "a substantial change in
circumstances" which "must have occurred since the entry of the decree
and not contemplated in the decree itself." Pur fee v. Pur fee.
716, (Utah App. 1990).

796P.2d713y

§78-45-7.2(7)(b) gives six items constituting a

substantial change in circumstances, including '"material changes in
custody." [Emphasis added.]
4. The merits of how to modify the child support
order of a divorce decree are not reached until the
threshold requirement of a substantial change in
circumstances have been met. If that threshold is not
met, the merits are never considered.
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the child support modification case of Durfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d
713, 716, (Utah App. 1990), it was held, "On a petition for a modification
of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Citing Durfee. the
same statement was held applicable in the alimony child case of Moore v.
Moore. 872 P.2d 1054, 1055, (Utah 1994). The same statement has been
applied in the child custody case of Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719,
footnote 1 at 722, Utah App.1994), and in the property division case oiHill
v. Hill. 968 P. 2d 866, 869, (Utah App. 1998). The threshold requirement
applies across the spectrum of divorce decree modification.
The two-step procedure outlined in the child custody case of Hogge
v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982), is still good law and is applicable

In Utah, requests for changes in custody arrangements
are considered through a bifurcated procedure. The Utah
Supreme Court requires that the trial court first 'receive
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any change
in those circumstances upon which the earlier award of
custody was based
' During this step, the party seeking
modification must show: (1) a change of circumstances upon
which the earlier custody arrangement was based and (2) that
the changes are sufficiently substantial and material to
justify reopening the question of custody
However, where the burden o f p r o o f i s n o t met, the trial
court will not reach the second step, the petition to modify
will be denied, and the existing custody award will remain
unchanged.
The meaning of the term "threshold requirement" is that no other
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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issue of a case is considered until that requirement is met. This is
clearly shown in the divorce case of Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 250y
(Utah App. 1987), when in the context of collateral estoppel the Court
stated, "Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach the merits of
appellant's other points on appeal." The same principle was mentioned
in the divorce case of Toone v. Toone. 952 P. 2d 112, 115, (Utah App. 1998),
in these words: "Having concluded, as a matter of law, that Parkhurst has
not shown a change of circumstances as would permit modification
of the decree, it is unnecessary to consider whether affirmative defenses
would have been available to bar the petition if Parkhurst had met the
threshold change-of-circumstances requirement."
5. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
find that a minor chanee in visitation constituted
grounds for modifying child support.
In order for a court to modify an existing child support order of less
than three years standing it is necessary under §78-45-7.2(a) that there be
"a substantial change in c i r c u m s t a n c e s / This is a threshold requirement
which must be shown prior to proceeding with the merits of how it ought
to be modified.
In this case, the findings of the trial court quoted in the Statement
of Facts show that the court found that the visitation order was
unworkable and in need of modification. The trial court issued an
order continuing existing custody and modifying visitation by a net
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1% of the father's nights with the children. The court then simply
moved directly to modifying child support without any meaningful
finding or analysis whatever of the threshold requirement under
§78-45-7.2(7)(b) of a substantial change in circumstances. It was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to use the visitation change
as a basis for ordering a change in child support.
The trial court itself, as quoted above, stated that the previous
custody arrangement would not be changed in that "[t]he parties will
continue to share joint legal and physical custody oftheir three minor
children."

The only change ordered was a specific

visitation

schedule in place of a general one, which was itself extremely minor. It
changed the father's visitation from 3 8% of nights (R. 448, page 48, lines
21-22)to 37% of nights (R. 400, quoted above, Order on Modification or
New Trial, paragraph 2; see also R. 448, page 50, lines 14-16).
§78-45-7.2(7) (b)(i) provides that "material changes in custody" can
be a basis for modifying a child support order. However, this order
continuing existing custody and modifying visitation by a net 1% is
inconsequential, not material. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to use it as a basis for ordering a change in child support.
"Abuse of discretion means that the trial court's ruling is 'beyond
the limits of reasonability.'" State v. Hamilton. 827P.2d232y

239-40(Utah

1992). The improper application of the law to a situation is an abuse of
discretion. Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989).
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial court failed to clearly delineate bet ween the grounds for
modifying visitation and for modifying child support. When the
burden of proof on showing the threshold issue of a change in
circumstances was not met in the area of child support, the trial court
abused its discretion when it did not deny the petition to modify the
childsupport.
6.
The trial court's cursory findings of fact are
insufficient to support the legal conclusion that
grounds exist for modification of the original child
support order.
The reader is invited to go back to the findings of the trial court
stated in the Statement of Relevant Facts on pages 4 and 5. These cursory
findings of fact, as framed by the trial court, are legally insufficient even
if true.

Accordingly, the appellant "need not engage in a futile

marshalling exercise." Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, footnote
2. (Utah App. 1999). The findings on their face are brief and superficial,
and utterly fail to disclose either a method of analysis by the trial court
or a legal basis under §78-45-7.2(7) for finding a substantial change in
circumstances.
The Court of Appeals in Williamson

noted that "the trial court

stated that it was 'painting with a broad brush...

The trial court,

however, should have substituted a sharpened pencil for its broad brush
and set forth detailed findings on the factors specified.../

The lower

court decision was reversed for "insufficiency of the findings below."
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As in this case now on appeal, the trial court's finding in
Williamson

failed to "be sufficiently detailed and

include enough

subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion of
each factual issue was reached.* Muiv v. Muiv. 841 P.2d 736, 739, (Utah
App. 1992). See also Williamson v. Williamson.

983 P.2d 1103. (Utah App.

1999).
"The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these
changes support the modification made in the prior divorce decree
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted and only support the judgment." Muiv. at 739. The trial
court's findings in this case now on appeal are inadequate to support a
modification of a decree, but even as it is the trial court's failure to
delineate why these changes support the modification is reversible error
because the facts are not clear or uncontroverted and do not only
support the judgment.
Failure to enter detailed findings concerning child

support

determination constitutes an abuse of discretion. A lived v. A lived. 797
P.2d 1108, 111 (Utah App. 1990). The improper application of the law to
a situation is an abuse of discretion. Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah
App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
The trial court order modifying the child support obligations of the
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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father should be vacated because (1) there was no substantial change
in circumstances relating to the issue of child support, and (2) the
cursory findings of the trial court were legally inadequate to
support a finding of a substantial change in circumstances.
2

day of December, 1999.
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30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order.
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an order that
established joint legal custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both
custodians have materially and substantially changed since the
entry of the order to be modified, or the order has become
unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the
decree would be an improvement for and in the best interest of
the child.
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by
order of the court if both parents file a motion for termination.
At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal custody,
the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under
Section 30-3-10. All related issues, including visitation and
child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the court.
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is
filed or answered frivolously and in a manner designed to harass
the other party, the court shall assess attorney's fees as costs
against the offending party.

(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and
decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the
district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first degree
or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital
felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other
criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and
Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital
felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court
for original appellate review and determination any matter over
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
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of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative
order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered
on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of
temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and
considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts
resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut
the presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who
live in the home of that parent and are not children in common to
both parties may at the option of either party be taken into
account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child
support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute
the obligations of the respective parents for the additional
children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the
appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the
instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other than those in
common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in
the award but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the
award.
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust the
amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the
court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child,
determine whether there is a difference between the amount
ordered and the amount that would be required under the
guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or more and the
difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is
not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b).
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any
time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support
order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change
in circumstances may include:
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
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(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of
the parties;
(iii) material changes of 3 0% or more in the income of a
parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child;
and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of
either parent for the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the
court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child,
determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it has,
the court shall then determine whether the change results in a
difference of 15% or more between the amount of child support
ordered and the amount that would be required under the
guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is
not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of
child support ordered to that which is provided for in the
guidelines.
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order
under Subsections (6) and (7) shall be included in each child
support order issued or modified after July 1, 1997.
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STEPHEN I. ODA, #2446
Attorney at Law
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 546-1264

Nov Z5 I I 5s AH'36
C L E R K , : * - , : : 37.COURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

INB^AND

FOR

•C \ 1

DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
TYLER DARAN BOYCE,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
TAMMY LINGE BOYCE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9647 01453 DA

This matter having come before the above entitled Court, and the Court
having reviewed this matter, Plaintiffs Complaint, the parties' Stipulation and
Agreement resolving all issues and the Affidavit in support of the Decree of
Divorce

and

being

fully

advised

hereby

renders

its

decision

in

writing

wherein a Decree is ordered to be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against
the Defendant;

now by virtue of the law and the premises and in accordance

with the facts found and Conclusions of Law aforesaid, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That

the

bonds

of

matrimony

now

and

heretofore

existing

between the Plaintiff and the Defendant be, and they are, hereby dissolved and
the parties be, and they

are, hereby

restored to the status of

unmarried

persons, this Decree of Divorce becoming absolute and final upon entry.
2.

That each party

be, and they are, hereby

awarded the joint

custody of the minor children, namely: CRYSTAL ANN BOYCE, born March 16,
1990; CAMILLE T. BOYCE, born December 8, 1991; and SHANDI LIN BOYCE, born
April

16, 1995, with joint physical custody with Defendant's home as the

JUDGMENT ENTERED
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primary residence and granting Plaintiff

equal control

and input into the

children's lives, and Plaintiff having liberal rights of visitation.
3.

That Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby required to pay Defendant, for

the support of the minor children, the sum of $796.00 per month, a sum in
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Schedule and each party's gross
monthly income, plus 1/2 of any actually incurred day-care, expenses incurred
by Defendant to maintain her employment.
4.

That obligor parent's income is subject to income withholding for

payment of said child support obligation together with a processing fee of
$7.00 per month, all in accordance with the Universal Income Withholding
provisions

62A-11-501-504

Utah Code Annotated unless obligor's

employer

provides an allotment.
5.

No alimony should be awarded to either party as both are self-

sufficient.
6.

The Court, after taking all issues into consideration, does hereby

order that Defendant be, and she is, hereby required to assume and pay the
following debts, holding Plaintiff harmless therefrom:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

First Security cash reserve and resulting interest $1,031.55
Returned check for auto insurance (payable to Plaintiff $ 64.83)
37% of credit card debt owing Choice and Nations Credit
card of $5,650.00 = $2,090.50 payable to Plaintiff
Debt on 1994 Plymouth Acclaim auto
All other bills relating to the Centerville home and
property

and that Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby required to assume and discharge the
following debts, holding Defendant harmless therefrom:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Balance of Choice Credit Card and Nations Credit
card
Counseling bill
Debt on 1992 Oldsmobile Achieva
All other bills relating to the Kaysville home and property
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7.

That Defendant be, and she is, hereby awarded the following

property:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
I.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
u.
v.
w.
x.
y.
z.
aa.
bb.
cc.
dd.
ee.
ff.
gg.
hh.
ii.
jj.
kk.
II.
mm.
nn.
oo.
pp.
qq.
rr.
ss.
tt.
uu.

15-20 Home movies (to be recorded and returned to
Tyler
All statues
Pair of white lamps
2 oak filing cabinets
Nick-knack shelf and picture above it
Personal effects and belongings
2 plants (not the silk tree or palm like plant)
Cedar chest
All holiday decorations including Christmas tree
Blue storage bins
Newest TV
Newest VCR
White and gold dressers w/matching desk and hutch
New king-size bed
2/3 of kitchen cupboard contents
2/3 of food storage
2/3 of Tupperware and containers
Wedding album and children's photo albums (Not to be
disassembled and to remain available to Plaintiff to see
or duplicate under Defendant's supervision)
Scroll-saw
Green/white dresser and 2 white folding chairs
Piano
Pair of pink chairs
White couch
Freezer
Computer
Sewing machine
Serger/sewer
New vacuum and yellow portable vacuum
Copy machine
Quilting frames
(2) heavy steel swing sets
Crib, high chair and stroller
Over 50 movies
New trampoline
Little Tykes playhouse, slide and table
Swinging park bench
Double shot basketball game
Wood sander
Propane Bar-B-Que Grill
Ice Cream Maker
Metal filing cabinet
Locking wood cabinet
CD Player
Automatic bread maker
Mini bunk beds
Red lawn mower
Wedding china set
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vv.
ww.
xx.
yy.

Wheat grinder
Hand mixer
Electric fry pan
Crock pot

and that Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby awarded the following property:

8.

a.

All items not specifically awarded to Defendant

b.

All personal effects and belongings

That

each

party

will

refrain

from

entering

the

respective

properties of the other without the direct consent of the other.
9.

That Plaintiff

be,

and he is, hereby

awarded the

Kaysville

residence located at 93 West 400 South, Kaysville, Utah.
10.

That Defendant be, and she is, hereby awarded the Centerville

home located at 744 East 800 South, Centerville, Utah, in the process of
completion.

The home has a construction loan partially disbursed.

Defendant

shall complete the home and have complete and absolute control over the
construction

and

loan

draws.

Defendant

will

finance

the

home

upon

completion without Plaintiffs name as an obligor.
11.

That Defendant's home in Centerville has equity exceeding the

Kaysville home awarded to Plaintiff.

Defendant be, and she is, hereby

required to pay Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 to equalize equities.

Said sum

shall be payable upon the occurrence of one of the following:
a.
Remarriage of Defendant, payable within two (2)
years of remarriage date
b.
Sale of the home
c.
The home is no longer Defendant's principal residence or
d.
The youngest child of the parties turns 18 or becomes
emancipated.
Defendant has the option to pay Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 in lieu of
$10,000.00 equity payable forthwith upon signing of the Decree of Divorce.
12.

That

insurance

during

beneficiaries

each
the

party

shall

minority

of

maintain
the

$50,000.00

children,

naming

minimum
the

in

children

thereon.
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life
as

13.

That each party be, and they are, hereby required to provide

health, accident and dental insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor
children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in existence as
of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's
current or subsequent
insurance.

place

of employment, Plaintiffs

is to be primary

Each party is ordered to pay for one-half of the premium for the

insurance coverage of the children and one-half of any deductible or noncovered amounts for such essential medical or dental services or prescriptions
related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to provide
other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to
insure the prompt payment of the insured portion of such claims.
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation
orthodontia
psychological

work

or elective

surgery

for the children,

or any

counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating

type

for
of

co-payment

from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in
writing.

The non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say

in the selection of doctors and procedures for any and all orthodontia, or
surgery procedures, or psychological
expected to contribute.

counseling, for which he or she is

If such debts are incurred without said consultation,

and written consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie
obligation to pay any non-insurance covered expense.
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than
emergency), medical, orthodontic or psychological counseling be done as a coobligation, the matter shall be brought back before the court.

The party found

to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees.
For procedures not covered by insurance but reasonably within
the parties' ability to pay and necessary to the welfare of the children, such as
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orthodontia

cosmetic

surgery,

or

mental

medical

then

each

party

will

normally be ordered to pay 1/2 of the costs associated with such treatments or
procedures.
When

the

other

parent

is

expected

to

be

responsible

for

deductible amounts attributable to medical or dental expenses incurred for the
parties' children,

then

the

incurring

parent

must

provide

copies

of

all

receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any
billing therefore incurred.

Any claims not made to the other parent within

that time frame in writing will be primae facie deemed waived. The other
party

is

ordered

arrangements
supporting
14.

to

make

their

to do so within
required

portion

45 days

of

of

those

receipt

payments,
of the

or

make

documentation

participation.

That Plaintiff be, and he is, hereby allowed to claim the parties'

oldest child and Defendant shall be allowed to claim the parties' youngest child
with each party claiming the middle child in alternate years with Plaintiff
claiming the odd years and Defendant claiming the even years.
15.

That each party be, and they are, hereby required to assume and

pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
16.

That each party be, and they are, hereby required to sign all

deeds and documents necessary and proper to effect transfer of assets and/or
obligations as provided herein.
DATED this& .

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
CONTENT:

Attorney for Defendant
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APPENDIX C
Respondent's Proposed
Order of Modification
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DEC

D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (#3668)
Attorney for Respondent
Sessions Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801)292-1818
Fax:
(801) 292-2525

Zd

3 % AH 'S3

00

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

TYLER BOYCE,

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
ORDER OF MODIFICATION

Petitioner,
vs.
TAMMY L. GOBLE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 964701453DA
Honorable Jon M. Memmott

The Petitioner for Modification filed by Petitioner Tyler Boyce came before the Court for
trial July 13, 1998 before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. Petitioner was present and
represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. Respondent was present and represented by counsel Terry
Cathcart. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does
enter the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
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1.

The parties will continue to share joint legal and physical custody of their three minor

children. Petitioner is awarded the following specific visitation schedule with the minor children
as follows:
a.

Alternate weekends from Friday until Monday morning;

b.

One midweek overnight each week on either Tuesday or Thursday;

c.

Alternate holidays in accordance with the Statewide Standard Schedule;

d.

One-half the summer which will include each party having two weeks uninterrupted
time with the minor children and if the parties cannot agree on an alternate time
hearing schedule for the summer they will each have two weeks in a row alternating
through the summer.

2.

The above-referenced time sharing represents Petitioner having 37% of the nights and

Respondent having 63% of the nights and these percentages will be used in a joint custody
worksheet format to calculate child support. The Petitioner's income is $3,279 gross per month, the
Respondent's income is zero. Based on the calculations, Petitioner will pay child support of $563.00
per month to Respondent effective August 1, 1998.
3.

Upon Respondent obtaining employment she will immediately give notice to

Petitioner so that the issue of child support can be reviewed.
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DATED this < g & - day o f t ^ £ ,

, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT
District Court Judge
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TYLER BOYCE,
Plaintiff,

j
I
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
| RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL

vs.

J

TAMMY L. GOBLE,

j
j
I
S

Defendant.

Case No.: 964701453 DA
Judge: Jon M. Memmott

ooOoo
The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial came before the Court on
April 20, 1999 before the Honorable Jon Memmott presiding. Plaintiff was present in person
and represented by Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by
counsel Michael Nielsen. The Court heard argument, reviewed the record and file herein and
made the following findings and ruling:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is denied.

2.

The Court finds that at the time of trial herein July 31, 1998 the Court heard

evidence that the parties agreed in their original divorce stipulation to joint legal and joint
physical custody of their minor children and liberal visitation. The Court found that since entry
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,1may contain errors.
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of the Decree there have been substantial, material changes in circumstances wherein the parties
were unable to agree on a visitation schedule and that both parties filed petitions to modify
stating that the joint custody terms of the Decree were unworkable. At trial, the Court found
that the parties had resolved many disputes in mediation and through the temporary orders of
the Court including having agreed to continue the joint legal and joint physical custody of their
children and having agreed on a visitation schedule awarding to Plaintiff Tyler Boyce 37 % of
the time with the children, and Defendant having 63 % of the time with the children. Based on
the new visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, the Court deemed it appropriate that
the parties use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate the amount of future child support.
3.

Further, at the time of trial, the Court learned through testimony that Mrs. Goble,

the Defendant was not working full-time having previously been a school teacher and was
currently staying home with the children. Based on that change, the Court sua sponte deemed
it appropriate that zero income be imputed to Defendant for purposes of calculating child
support.
4.

The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion for attorneys fees and finds that

although Defendant did not really present evidence in her Motion which would have been
considered in a new trial, that both parties reasonably incurred fees for the post-trial motions and
each should bear their own costs and fees.
DATED this Z 5 daffiof ^ J U L / V ^

, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

Approyaf^as to Farm:
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
D. Michael Nielsen
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